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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
consists of violation of a statute, a court must determine against
what risks the statute was designed to protect. But absent a
statute defendant might have violated the general duty of due
care by obstructing the highway. The court would then have had
to determine against what risks this nonstatutory duty was
designed to protect.
By rejecting "proximate cause" in the instant case, it is sub-
mitted that the court was able to reach its decision by clearly
discussing the reasons for it. It is recommended that this ap-
proach be used to decide negligence cases in the future.
Frank F. Foil
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - AGGRESSOR DOCTRINE
CHALLENGED
Plaintiff took offense at being called "Shorty" by a fellow
employee. During an ensuing exchange of harsh words plaintiff
struck the other employee in the face with a pair of pants. The
latter, uninjured, responded by hitting plaintiff, causing a brain
injury. Plaintiff sued his employer's workmen's compensation
insurer claiming compensation for the resultant injury. The de-
fenses asserted were that the cause of plaintiff's injuries was his
wilful intention to injure another and that plaintiff had been the
aggressor. The court of appeal reversed the district court's de-
cision for plaintiff.' On writ of certiorari, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court reversed. Held, neither ordinary fault nor the "ag-
gressor doctrine" has any place in the application of the Louisi-
ana Workmen's Compensation Act. In order to sustain the statu-
tory defense of wilful intent defendant must prove that plaintiff
entertained a wilful and premeditated intention to injure an-
other. Velotta v. Liberty Mutual In.surance Co., 241 La. 814, 132
So. 2d 51 (1961).2
Louisiana's workmen's compensation statute provides that an
employee cannot recover compensation if his injury was caused
by his own "wilful intention" to injure another.3 The burden of
1. Velotta v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 126 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1961).
2. The same case, reported at 134 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), deals
with quantum of damages.
3. LA. R.S. 23:1081 (1950): "No compensation shall be allowed for an injury
[Vol. XXIII
1962] NOTES
proving this defense is upon the employer. Although in some
compensation cases the courts have limited their inquiries to the
question of wilful intent,4 they have more commonly considered
the nebulous tort concept of aggression.5 As applied to work-
men's compensation, this concept precludes recovery by the orig-
inal assailant6 unless he was sufficiently provoked 7 or had re-
tired from the affray.8
In the instant case the Supreme Court recognized that the
emotions of employees often cause friction between them.9 This
caused (1) by the injured employee's wilful intention to injure himself or to
injure another, or (2) by the injured employee's intoxication at the time of the
injury, or (3) by the injured employee's deliberate failure to use an adequate
guard or protection against accident provided for him or (4) by the employee's
deliberate breach of statutory regulations affecting safety of life or limb.
"In determining whether or not an employer shall be exempt from and relieved
of paying compensation because of injury sustained by an employee for the causes
and reasons set forth in this Section, the burden of proof shall be upon the
employer."
4. Jenkins v. Cities Service Refining Corp., 44 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1950) ; Burkhardt v. City of Monroe, 37 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948)
Keyhea v. Woodward-Walker Lumber Co., 147 So. 830 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933)
Toney v. Geo. A. Fuller Co., 143 So. 541 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932) Morris v.
Young & DeBritton, 9 La. App. 180, 119 So. 277 (1st Cir. 1928) Fisher v.
Sherrill Hardwood Lumber Co., 3 La. App. 595 (1st Cir. 1926).
5. Landry v. Gilger Drilling Co., 92 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; Cater
v. 'Travelers Ins. Co., 83 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955); Gross v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 25 So. 2d 837 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946) ; Pierson v.
Sterling Sugars Inc., 149 So. 903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933) ; Garrett v. Texas-
Louisiana Light & Power Co., 19 La. App. 858, 141 So. 809 (2d Cir. 1932).
At least one compensation case indicates that the claimant need not have been
the aggressor in fact, but need only have led the other party "reasonably to be-
lieve" that claimant was the aggressor. Turner v. Baton Rouge Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., 15 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943).
Comment, Tort, Recovery by Aggressor for Personal Injuries Received in
Encounter, 12 LA. L. REV. 469, 470 (1952) : "One who provokes a difficulty with
another cannot recover damages for injuries inflicted upon him as a result thereof,
even though the conduct of the one who inflicts the injuries was not justified in
law."
1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 1.20 (1952): "Almost every
major error that can be observed in the development of compensation law . . .
can be traced either to the importation of tort ideas, or, less frequently, to the
assumption that the right to compensation resembles the right to the proceeds of
an insurance policy."
6. Courts considering compensation disputes have applied both civil and crim-
inal concepts of aggression. Cater v. Travelers Ins. Co., 83 So. 2d 514 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1955) ; Morvant v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 181 So. 595 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1938).
7. Provocative words have been held sufficient "justification" for an attack.
Cater v. Travelers Ins. Co., 83 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955). Contra, Conley
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
8. Landry v. Gilger Drilling Co., 92 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) (re-
covery allowed if claimant retired from the affray and was attacked thereafter).
9. 241 La. at 824, 132 So. 2d at 54: "In the relationship between fellow em-
ployees, it is inevitable that their emotions will cause friction between them."
The court also noted that recovery should not be 'barred by action "growing out
of the duties of the employment and incidental and necessary relationship to other
employees." Ibid.
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accords with the present trend of authority that the desirable
test for determining the right to compensation in the aggressor
cases is whether the circumstances giving rise to the injury were
typical of the working environment.10 The court expressly dis-
Louisiana courts have been slow to acknowledge that daily frictions between
workingmen may cause dissension. Phelps v. United Carbon Co., 8 La. App. 128
(2d Cir. 1928). However, some cases have at least indicated that the courts real-
ized daily working contact between enemies did not improve their relationship.
Keyhea v. Woodward-Walker Lumber Co., 147 So. 830 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933) ;
Millspaugh v. Opelousas Cotton Gin Co., 139 So. 666 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932).
10. Generally, fault plays no part in the law of workmen's compensation. The
elimination of contributory negligence as a defense is a prime example of this.
MALONE, LOUISIANA'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 32
(1951). Nevertheless, some twenty-three states allow the defense that when an
employee was injured as a result of "wilfully intending" to injure another he can-
not recover. Eight more states deny compensation for injury resulting from "wil-
ful misconduct." 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 11.15(d) (1952).
Some courts have taken the position that although the employer has failed to
establish that the claimant wilfully intended to injure another, yet the claimant's
conduct was such that it did not arise out of the employment, and thus denied
compensation. Stulginski v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co., 124 Conn. 355, 199 Atl.
653 (1938) ; Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Haynie, 43 Ga. App. 579, 159 S.E.
781 (1931). Perhaps because the defense of wilful intent to injure another is a
concession to the fault principle, courts have not confined their considerations to
that issue alone and have, whether consciously or not, employed the criminal and
general tort concepts of the aggressor doctrine. 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 265 (1958). In doing so, some courts have limited their inquiries to whether
the claimant was the aggressor and have glossed over the wilful intent requirement.
Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Haynie, 43 Ga. App. 579, 159 S.E. 781 (1931) ;
Fischer v. Industrial Comm., 408 Ill. 115, 96 N.E.2d 478 (1951) ; Jackson v. Comp.
Com'r, 127 W. Va. 59, 31 S.E.2d 848 (1944). Fortunately the present trend
appears to be toward ignoring the aggressor doctrine and considering only the
specific statutory defense of wilful intent. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940) ; John-
son v. Safreed, 273 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1954), 15 NACCA L.J. 29; State Compen-
sation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm. & Paul J. Hull, 38 Cal. 2d
659, 242 P.2d 311 (1952), 9 NACCA L.J. 64, 13 OHIo ST. L.J. 543; David Dil-
lon's Case, 324 Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69 (1949), 3 NACCA L.J. 86; Petro v.
Martin Baking Co., 58 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1953), 7 VAND. L. REV. 153; Newell
v. Moreau, 94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476 (1947) ; Martin v. Snuffy's Steak House,
134 A.2d 789 (N.J. 1957), 21 NACCA L.J. 164; Commission v. The Bronx Hos-
pital, 97 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct. 1950), 5 NACCA L.J. 73; Schueller v. Armour
& Co., 116 Pa. Super. 323, 176 Atl. 527 (1935) ; SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION LAW OF INDIANA § 6.8 (1950) ; Calamari, Assaults by Fellow Employees
Under the FELA and the Jones Act, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 449 (1959) ; Horovitz,
Assaults & Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. REV. 311
(1947) ; 11 NACCA L.J. 19 (1953) ; 4 NACCA L.J. 19 (1949) ; 2 NACCA L.J.
26 (1948). The reasons for this apparent trend seem to be twofold: first, the
realization that fault has no place in the workmen's compensation scheme; and
second, the present propensity toward more liberal construction of workmen's com-
pensation acts in favor of employees. The trend may be analogous to that in the
"horseplay" cases. Notes, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 600 (1959), 15 RUTGERS L. REV.
139 (1960). The courts initially said that horseplay did not "arise out of" em-
ployment, but later held that horseplay accidents were indeed part of the industrial
world. Similarly, with the aggressor defense, courts are tending to question the
logic of making the outcome turn upon who struck the first blow. Johnson v.
Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545 (1954). Thus, for more than a decade some
jurisdictions have acted upon the realistic notion that when industry calls men of
all stations of life together, it creates many new frictions, and violence flares up
expectably when accumulated strains finally overcome frayed patience. Hartford
approved the workmen's compensation cases that have applied
the aggressor rule, 1 stating that "the mere fact that the em-
ployee seeking recovery may have been to blame for the fray is
not adequate to meet the [statutory] test - there must be
more."' 12 Thus, it seems that the aggressor doctrine should now
be inapplicable in Louisiana compensation disputes; when the
statutory defense is raised the sole question should be whether
there was a wilful intent on the part of the claimant to injure
another. The court, indicating that wilful intent signified some-
thing akin to malice or premeditation, 13 rejected the idea that
impulsive violence, per se, justifies application of the statutory
defense. This accords with those authorities indicating that the
intention of the legislatures, in enacting compensation statutes,
was to prohibit the award of benefits only in cases in which the
employee entertained a serious criminal intent.
1 4
After stating that wilful intent is the sole test of recovery,
the Supreme Court glossed its rule by saying that whether re-
taliation might reasonably be expected 15 from the attacked em-
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F. 2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 649 (1940).
For a discussion of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, see Calamari, As-
saults by Fellow Employees Under the FELA and the Jones Act, 28 FORDHAM L.
REV. 449 (1959).
11. 241 La. at 821, 132 So. 2d at 53: "Although the results reached in these
cases would not necessarily be erroneous, it would appear that the statutory pro-
vision involved does not require a resort to doctrines not there enunciated."
12. Id. at 822, 132 So. 2d at 54.
13. Ibid.: "Impulsive conduct, such as a push, shove, or a fist-blow, does not
render the conduct of the employee sufficiently serious or grave, and there is no
wilful intention to injure one's self or another under such circumstances."
14. Id. at 820, 132 So. 2d at 53: "The requirement of the statute setting forth
the proof necessary for this special defense is a stern one, for 'wilful intention
to injure' undoubtedly was added to the Workmen's Compensation Act to support
the generally prevailing belief that no person should be rewarded for injuries which
flow from his criminal conduct of a serious and wilful nature." (Emphasis added.)
Johnson v. Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545 (1954) ; Newell v. Moreau, 94
N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476 (1947) ; MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW AND PRACTICE § 345 (1951) ; Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Work-
men's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. REv. 311 (1947); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's
Compensation § 265 (1958).
Examples of serious criminal conduct: Jenkins v. Cities Service Refining Corp.,
44 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) (45 minutes after verbal exchange employee
attacked fellow employee with a pipe) ; Morris v. Young & DeBritton, 9 La. App.
180, 119 So. 277 (1st Cir. 1928) (without provocation foreman shot employee).
15. The court speaks only of retaliation in its statement of the "reasonable
expectation" test. In this, the court ignores those injuries incurred when an em-
ployee with a wilful intent to injure another is injured by an inanimate object
or a third person, rather than by retaliation of the proposed victim of the attack.
Suppose that employee A does some act of serious criminal aggression toward B.
Assume also that B could be expected to react only mildly because of some physical
handicap. But, by use of some weapon, he reacts quite violently. Since one could
not reasonably foresee this excessive violence, A will not be denied the benefit of
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ployee is the measure of the aggressor's intent.16 This is unfor-
tunate in that it tends to lead the court's inquiry away from the
primary consideration of wilful intent. The "reasonable expecta-
tion" test may already have had this ill effect. In Garner v.
Avondale Marine Ways, Inc.,17 an employee attempted to move a
scaffolding upon which the plaintiff was standing. Plaintiff im-
mediately hit the employee, who responded by tackling plaintiff
and injuring him. The court of appeal cited and distinguished
the instant case, then dubbed the claimant the aggressor. Rather
than simply inquiring whether the claimant wilfully intended to
injure another, the court directed primary attention to whether
claimant reasonably expected retaliation. Finding that he did,
the court considered the "wilful intent" defense sustained.'8
It is submitted that the instant decision was correct. The
court properly recognized that the basic policy underlying work-
men's compensation is the elimination of fault as the basis for
denying recovery except as expressly provided by statute. Resort
by the court of appeal in the Garner case to the Supreme Court's
"reasonably expected retaliation" language has shown, however,
that the instant decision may be interpreted as not eliminating
the aggressor doctrine in compensation litigation. It is respect-
fully submitted that this language is dictum and should not be
employed in future decisions. The statutory defense of wilful
intent should be interpreted to deny recovery only in those cases
compensation under the enunciated test. It would seem that the Supreme Court
did not intend this result.
16. 241 La. at 822, 132 So. 2d at 54: "The test should involve an inquiry into
the existence of some premeditation and malice on the part of the claimant, coupled
with a reasonable expectation of bringing about a real injury to himself or an-
other. If the retaliation which flows from his misconduct is not such as could be
reasonably expected, his intention could not be held to envision that result and
hence is not within the purview of the quoted provisions of the Act." (Emphasis
added.)
The "reasonably expected retaliation" test was apparently borrowed from the
field of torts. Azevedo v. Frasca, 128 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Ditt-
man v. Long, 114 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959) ; Davis v. Maddox, 100 So. 2d
905 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) ; Smith v. Parker, 59 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1952) ; Britt v. Merritt, 45 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
17. 134 So. 2d 703 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) .
18. Id. at 707: "[P]laintiff was not only the aggressor but . . . he had a 'rea-
sonable expectation of bringing a real injury' to him when he struck [the other
employee]. . . . Furthermore, [the other employee's] retaliation . . . was in fact
much less than plaintiff 'could reasonably expect' and his intention could clearly
'envision' even greater retaliation." (Emphasis added.) Instead of accepting the
rationale of the Supreme Court in the instant case, the court in Garner said, id.
at 707: "We have given careful consideration [to it] . . . and our appreciation
of it is that the words premeditation 'tinged with some degree of malice' were
used by the court simply as denoting the opposite of 'impulsive or as a result of
an instinctive act.' " (Emphasis added.) It is respectfully submitted that the
Garner case is discordant with the rationale of the instant case.
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in which the claimant is guilty of serious criminal conduct. If
the Supreme Court is to be successful in eliminating the ag-
gressor doctrine in workmen's compensation, the court's next de-
cision dealing with the issue must be more explicit.
Bert K. Robinson
